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The recent waves of political crises in Africa and the Middle East have inspired the debate over how 
political instability could pose a risk of financial contagion to emerging countries. With retrospect to the 
Kenyan political crisis, our findings suggest stock markets in Lebanon, Mauritius were contaminated 
while Nigeria experienced a positive spillover. Our results have two major implications. Firstly, we have 
confirmed existing consensus that African financial markets are increasingly integrated. Secondly, we 
have also shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crisis; 
political crises effects should not be undermined.  
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INTRODUCTION 
  
The recent Jasmine (Tunisian) and Egyptian revolutions 
have set pace for socio-political unrest in other Middle 
East and African countries. While they might have been 
short-lived, the Ivorian and Libyan crises which have 
gone on for months now could have dire economic and 
financial implications for said countries in particular and 
sub-regions in general. With much uncertainty on the 
direction of this wave of revolutions and political unrests 
in the months and/or years ahead, the need to assess 
how such could affect economic and/or financial 
development is crucial. Tunisian and Egyptian stock 
market operations were suspended at the onset of 
respective crises, leaving little room for a study based on 
shifts in stock market correlations. However, a parallel 
event in recent history which could help researchers in 
the same vein is the Kenyan political crisis of 2008. This 
study could be charming to investors and policy makers 
who should be interested in knowing how political crisis in 
one country might affect other countries financially. 
Findings could also quell growing concerns over whether  
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African stock markets are integrated. 
 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Literature on linkages between financial integration 
and crises 
 
Though domestic factors have often been seen as 
sources of crises, financial market integration could easily 
propagate them to other countries and/or markets. Many 
links exists via which such propagation could take place. 
Firstly as point out by Schmukler (2004), with the 
liberalization of a country’s financial system, it becomes 
an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign 
and domestic investors. Whereas in a closed economy 
only domestic investors monitor and react to unsound 
fundamentals, in an opened economy domestic and 
foreign investors do. Consequently, the absence of sound 
macroeconomic, financial and institutional fundamentals 
could increase the probability of crises. Therefore, 
antagonistic interests and views between investors 
(domestic and foreign) on key fundamentals could preci-
pitate crises and reduce the ability  to  effectively manage  
  
 
 
and monitor them. 
Secondly, even with the presence of sound domestic 
fundamentals and quality institutions, international                      
financial market imperfection could also bring about 
crises. Herding behavior, speculative attacks, irrational 
behavior, bubbles and crashes amongst others could be 
direct implications of such imperfections. For instance, 
regardless of market fundamentals, investors could 
speculate against a currency if they deem its exchange 
rate unsustainable. This situation pointed-out by Obstfeld 
(1986) has been supported and purported by many 
authors (Schmukler, 1986; Asongu, 2011ab). 
Thirdly, sound fundamentals and absence of imper-
fections in international capital markets are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for the prevention of crises. 
External factors (Schmukler, 2004) like determinants of 
capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign interest rates 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996) are potential sources of crises. 
As pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1996), the role of 
foreign interest rates could be crucial in determining the 
likelihood of financial crises in developing countries. In 
the same vein, for countries dependent on foreign capital, 
shifts in their flows could give birth to important financial 
issues and economic downturns.  
Last but  not the least, with respect to Schmukler 
(2004), integration could lead to financial crisis through 
contagion; that is, via shocks through real links, financial 
links and herding behavior or unexplained high 
correlations. This fourth effect of integration falls within 
the framework of our research question.   
 
 
Literature on definition and channels of contagion 
 
Definitions of contagion 
  
To this day, there is no established definition of contagion 
by economists. Borrowing from the World Bank, there are 
three main definitions of contagion.  
  Firstly, from a broad dimension, the phenomenon could 
be seen with the general process of shock transmission 
across countries.  
  This first definition takes account of both positive and 
negative spillover effects. Secondly, contagion could be 
understood as the propagation of shocks between two 
countries in excess of what should be expected with 
respect to fundamentals after considering co-movements 
triggered by common shocks. It should be pointed-out 
here that this second definition is somewhat restricted to 
only shocks and presupposes sound mastery of what 
constitutes underlying fundamentals.  
  The last and most restrictive definition considers 
contagion as the change in transmission mechanisms 
which take place during a period of turmoil and could be 
appreciated via a significant increase in cross market 
correlations. 
In this paper, we shall limit ourselves to the third 
definition of  contagion  because:  (1) Our  study  aims  to  
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investigate how a financial shock resulting from a political 
crisis could affect other existing financial markets 1(in 
antagonism to the first definition); (2) Our mastery of what 
constitutes underlying fundamentals in market co-
movements we are about to study is limited (as opposed 
to the second definition).   
From an empirical dimension, the third definition was 
first proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They 
conceived contagion as a significant increase in market 
co-movements after a shock has taken place in one 
country. According to them, the condition for contagion is 
a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a 
shock in one market.  
To stretch this point, if two markets display a high 
degree of co-movements during the stable period, even if 
they are highly correlated during the turmoil period, if the 
crisis-correlation is insignificant, then contagion has not 
taken place. The term “interdependence” is used to 
describe the situation with insignificant change in cross 
market correlations.  
 
 
Channels of contagion 
 
Borrowing from Schmukler (2004) and Pozo and Haile 
(2008), there are three main channels of contagion 
identified in the literature: (1) Real link often associated 
with trade links2; (2) Financial links3 and (3) The effect of 
herding behavior or panics resulting from asymmetric 
information (Khan and Park, 2009).   
 
 
Literature on the measure of contagion 
 
In the literature, many methods for measuring contagion 
have been proposed to appreciate international shocks 
across countries. The mostly applied are cross-market 
correlation coefficient measures (King and Wadhwani, 
1990; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Collins and Biekpe, 
2003; Lee et al., 2007; Asongu, 2011b), cross-market co-
integration vector changing procedures (Kanas, 1998), 
volatility analysis based on ARCH and GARCH 
techniques (King et al., 1994) and direct estimation 
transmission mechanisms (Forbes, 2000).  
In this study, we shall follow Asongu (2011a) in 
applying Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of 
Collins and Biekpe (2003).   
                                               
1The impact of the political crisis on the financial market is a negative 
shock and not a positive spillover.  
2For example when two markets are trading together and compete in 
the same external market, a devaluation of the exchange rate of one 
country diminishes the other’s competitive advantage. In an attempt to 
rebalance its external sectors, the losing country would in turn want to 
devaluate its own currency.  
3When two economies are connected through the international 
financial system, leverage institutions facing margins call could be 
impelled to take actions that would ripple shocks to other countries.  
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Figure 1. Nairobi Stock Exchange Index from 01/11/2007 to 29/02/2008. 
 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
We reiterate the goal of this paper to study correlations between the 
returns of the Kenyan stock index and stock indexes of other 
markets. Taking the Nairobi Stock Index as the base criterion, we 
investigate if co-movements between the base criterion and said 
financial markets were significantly strengthened during the 2008 
Kenyan political crisis. This crisis began on the 27th of December 
20074 and ended on the 28th of February 20085. The sample period 
is partitioned into two sets: A two-month pre-crisis (stable) period 
and a month crisis (turmoil) period. The pre-crisis period begins 
from the 01st of November 2007 to the 24th of December 2007. The 
crisis period ranges from the 04th of January 2008 to the 29th of 
January 2008. We assume here that any substantial price sensitive 
political implication should have occurred after the announcement 
of the election results (30/12/2007). More so, the full crisis period 
(27/12/2007 to 28/02/2008) is not assumed as the turmoil period 
because a stock market shock was not experienced during the 
entire period. As presented in Figure 1, the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE) experienced a shock from 04/01/2008 to 29/01/2008. Daily 
data used in the study is gotten from Bloomberg’s database. Our 
choice of local currency index return is because; Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) have shown that using dollar or local indices will 
produce similar outcomes.  
 
 
Methodology  
 
Contagion as defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is a significant 
increase in market co-movements after a shock in one country6.  
                                               
4
 Date at which, presidential elections were held. 
5
 Date at which Kibaki (incumbent) and Odinga (opposition leader) signed a 
power sharing agreement called the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. 
6Based on this definition, the presence of high correlation between two markets 
during the stable period and eventually continuous increase in the high degree 
of cross market co-movements at the turmoil period is not synonymous to 
The correlation coefficient is defined as:   
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With: ‘x’ the base criterion (Kenyan Stock Market) and ‘y’ a 
developing country equity market.  According to Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002), the correlation coefficient is adjusted in the 
following manner: 
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which evaluates the change in high period volatility against low 
period volatility. While, the crisis period is used as the high volatility 
period, the tranquil period is assumed to be the low volatility period 
in the calculation of this correlation coefficient adjuster. Contagion 
is eventually measured as the significance of adjusted correlation 
coefficients in the turmoil period versus the stable period.  
                                                                                   
contagion. Consequently contagion according to this definition is the presence 
of significant increase in co-movements after a shock. From the same lens, if 
the high correlation degree is not significant, the term “interdependence” is 
used to describe the situation.  
 
  
 
 
Collins and Biekpe (2003) and Lee et al. (2007) have applied the t-
test and F-test respectively for the significance of difference in 
correlations. As recently pointed out by Asongu (2011), when only 
one coefficient is to be estimated, both tests have the same 
implications. Owing to the t-statistics, the significance of increase in 
correlations during the turmoil period (t) with respect to the stable 
period is defined by: 
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with, nt (ns) indicating actual observed days during the turmoil 
(stable) period. 
 
The following hypothesis is then tested: 
 
0: 21 =− ρρoH  versus 0: 211 >− ρρH  
 
where: oH  is the null hypothesis of no contagion and 1H  is the 
alternative hypothesis of its presence.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Graphical representation of events in the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods 
 
As observed from Figure 1, there are two main troughs. 
While the first is considered in the stable period of our 
analysis, the second fully appreciates the incidence of the 
political crisis. The shock in the stock market eases and 
ends towards the turn of January. It might be interesting 
to point-out that the full effect of the shock was somewhat 
diluted by the January-effect7. As we must have pointed-
out earlier, we shall consider only the ‘unstable period 
with a stock market shock’ as the turmoil period in the 
empirical side of this paper.  
This is in line with our definition of contagion (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002). 
                              
 
Empirical results  
 
Tables 1 and 2 show conditional (unadjusted) and 
unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients, respect- 
tively. Correlation coefficients in the Table 2 are adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity with the help of Equation 2.  
 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
As   Table   1   shows,   correlation  coefficients  changed  
                                               
7
 The January Effect is a calendar related anomaly where financial markets 
experience prices increase.  
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significantly for Lebanon, Mauritius, Nigeria and South 
Africa during the turmoil period. Botswana, Egypt, 
Morocco, Namibia and Tunisia did not demonstrate 
substantial changes in correlation variance from the 
stable period to the crisis period. The result for South 
Africa is inconclusive after adjustment for hetero-
scedasticity (Table 2).  
Lebanon and Mauritius were contaminated while 
Nigeria experienced a significant positive spillover. As an 
investment decision implication, while the positive 
correlations in Lebanon and Mauritius imply negative 
price-effects, the negative correlation experienced in 
Nigeria indicates investing in the Nigerian stock market in 
response to the Kenyan political crisis would have been 
beneficial; ceteris paribus. 
Much is yet unknown about what makes countries 
vulnerable to contagion and through which channels 
contagion occurs. However, as we have elucidated 
earlier (Channels of contagion), a country’s weak 
economic fundamentals, macro-similarities, heavy expo-
sure to certain financial agents and international financial 
system state, can all increase the risk of sudden 
spillovers. Therefore, significant negative spillovers 
experienced in Lebanon and Mauritius could be explained 
from financial links and herding or irrational behavior. For 
instance, investors in contaminated markets might have 
sold securities that are fundamentally positively correlated 
with benchmark securities of the Kenyan stock market.  
Looking at the positive spillover effect in Nigeria, there 
is reason to conclude that certain investors acted 
irrationally during the political crisis by trading securities 
in the Kenyan stock market for those positively correlated 
with benchmark securities of the Nigerian stock market.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Political unrest has been found to affect economic growth 
both directly and indirectly (Campos and Karanasos, 
2008). This study has examined whether the 2008 
Kenyan political crisis influenced the stability correlation 
structure of African and neighboring stock markets. Using 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) methodology in the context 
of Collins and Biekpe (2003), we have shown that 
political instability in Africa does not have isolated within-
country financial effects. Our findings also support the 
thesis on growing integration of African stock markets. 
Though the concept of financial integration has far 
perceived benefits of risk spreading and allocation 
efficiency if returns from regional financial markets are 
stable and not correlated; the event of a crash in one 
market due to a political factor could severely be 
detrimental to international portfolio diversification. Within 
the framework of our study, while Lebanon and Mauritius 
experienced such negative spillovers, investors in 
Nigerian Stock Exchange benefited from the crisis; 
ceteris paribus. Our results have two  major  implications.
466        J. Econ. Int. Financ. 
 
 
 
Table 1. International stock indexes returns’ conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2008 
Kenyan political crisis. 
 
Country Full period Stable period Turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ t-test Co 
Botswana -0.072 0.004 -0.081 0.005 0.034 0.002 0.845 N 
Egypt -0.125 0.016 -0.093 0.012 -0.108 0.022 -0.106 N 
Lebanon 0.134 0.021 -0.134 0.023 0.249 0.019 3.014*** Y 
Mauritius 0.053 0.011 -0.187 0.011 0.222 0.012 3.263*** Y 
Morocco -0.384 0.010 -0.263 0.007 -0.120 0.010 1.053 N 
Namibia 0.083 0.021 0.191 0.019 -0.015 0.024 -1.529 N 
Nigeria -0.432 0.011 0.020 0.006 -0.405 0.006 -3.418*** Y 
South A -0.014 0.016 0.139 0.013 -0.143 0.022 -2.134** Y 
Tunisia -0.115 0.004 0.099 0.004 -0.096 0.005 -1.450 N 
 
Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is defined as the 2-month pre-crisis period 
(November 01, 2007 to December 24, 2007). The turmoil period is defined as the one-month crisis period (January 04, 
2008 to January 29, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the turmoil period (November 01, 2007 to January 
29, 2008). Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) 
occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value *, **, ***: represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. (nt+ns-4) degree of freedom for the t-statistics is (19+38-4). σ, represents the standard deviation; ρ, 
market correlation coefficients. 
 
 
 
Table 2. International stock indexes returns’ unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2008 Kenyan 
political crisis. 
 
Country Full period Stable period Turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ* σ ρ* σ δ t-test Co 
Botswana -0.072 0.004 -0.119 0.005 0.049 0.002 -0.533 1.242 N 
Egypt -0.125 0.016 -0.069 0.012 -0.079 0.022 0.847 -0.079 N 
Lebanon 0.134 0.021 -0145 0.023 0.268 0.019 -0.149 3.303*** Y 
Mauritius 0.053 0.011 -0.177 0.011 0.211 0.012 0.112 3.071*** Y 
Morocco -0.384 0.010 -0.223 0.007 -0.101 0.010 0.425 0.895 N 
Namibia 0.083 0.021 0.169 0.019 -0.013 0.024 0.285 -1.348 N 
Nigeria -0.432 0.011 0.019 0.006 -0.391 0.006 0.084 -3.27*** Y 
South A -0.014 0.016 0.105 0.013 -0.108 0.022 0.764 -1.585 N 
Tunisia -0.115 0.004 0.085 0.004 -0.082 0.005 0.377 -1.230 N 
 
Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The stable period is defined as the 2-month pre-crisis period (November 
01, 2007 to December 24, 2007). The turmoil period is defined as the one-month crisis period (January 04, 2008 to 
January 29, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the turmoil period (November 01, 2007 to January 29, 2008). 
Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the 
test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent significance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-
4) degree of freedom for the t-statistics is (19+38-4). σ, standard deviation. ρ* , adjusted correlation coefficients . δ, 
correlation coefficient adjuster; ρ, market correlation coefficients.  
 
 
 
Firstly, we have confirmed existing consensus that 
African financial markets are increasingly integrated. 
Secondly, we have also shown that international financial 
market transmissions not only occur during financial 
crisis; political crises effects should not be undermined.  
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